## 1NC

### Off

#### The absence of the animal is the presence of anthropocentrism

**Bell & Russell, 2000** (Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), **nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence**. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. **The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence** and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow moreunique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). **The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned.** Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. 1

#### The brutalization and racialization of black populations is horrific but there is an important divergence – they were never served on a plate and eaten – the ethics of eating should be the starting point of impact calculus

PUGLIESE ’13(Joseph, Research Director, MMCCS @ Macquarie U., State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones, pp. 44-45)

[gender modified]

In his profound meditation on ‘the caesura between the human and the animal’ as that which establishes the condition of possibility for the emergence of ‘the human,’ Agamben notes that the human is the result ‘of ceaseless divisions and caesurae.’48 ‘It is more urgent to work on these divisions,’ Agamben writes, ‘to ask in what way – within man – has ~~man~~ [humanity] been separated from the non-man, and the animal from the human, than it is to take positions on the great issues, on so-called human rights and values.’49 Agamben’s critical devaluation of human rights in the framework of human violence against animals has been amply theorized by a number of critics who, following Foucault, have demonstrated how rights are in fact complicit with regimes of subjugation and violent governance.50¶ In the course of her painstaking documentation of the scenes of violent subjection that mark the life and death of black slaves, Hartman, at one juncture in her narrative, cites the testimony of the slave Charlie Moses: ‘The way us niggers was treated was awful. Master would beat, knock, kick, kill. He done ever’ thing he could ’cept eat us.’51 The human master can, in other words, ‘beat, knock, kick, kill’ the animal and the slave but they cannot eat the enslaved human. Charlie Moses’ testimony evidences how the homology between human slave and enslaved animal holds right up to this interdictory limit point. The critical caesura that is evidenced here opens up the space that will enable the ‘noncriminal putting to death’ of animals by humans in order to enable humans’ ‘carno-phallogocentrism.’52 Articulated in Moses’ testimony is the biopolitical freedom to torture and kill enslaved forms of human life with absolute impunity and the attendant prohibition on eating the human-animal-slave. It is only due to this singular prohibition that Moses can inhabit, in the most radically qualified and fraught manner, the modality of the human. This intra-species prohibition functions to calibrate the human slave up one notch on the speciesist hierarchy of life. This interdiction, then, designates the only difference/division between human and animal available to the black slave. The difference between animal and human animal on the slave plantation hangs singularly on an intra-species prohibition that is animated by the most fragile of anthropocentric invocations: the only quarter granted to black slaves is to allow them a circumscribed space in which their fungibility encompasses everything but being served up as dinner on the master’s dinner table. This intra-species, anthropocentric prohibition operates as the term that cuts animals off from human animal-slaves, while articulating the entry of human slaves into a political life constituted by only one non-negotiable claim to the human: they could not be eaten.

#### Anthropocentrism is the original and foundational hierarchy that structures all other forms of oppression

**Best, 7** (Steven – Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>) //MD

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that **the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.** ¶ In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that **the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power.** A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. ¶ Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings.¶ The Origins of Hierarchy¶ "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras¶ It is little understood that **the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.** Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for **all other systems of domination** such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” ¶ Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. ¶ In the fifteenth century, **when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves.** Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. ¶ As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. ¶ Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for **speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples.** “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” ¶ Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. ¶ There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.¶

#### Our countermethodology is to write in the place of the animals that die – this process of forefronting the positionality of the animal is necessary to promote ethical self-reflexivity – the role of the ballot is to move towards a true political space

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(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their exclusion\*animals, the ‘‘constitutive outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization.¶ This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion, clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly lodged and dear to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Z ˇ izˇek (1999) writes, neglects how these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being.

### Case

#### Anti-blackness is contingent, not quotidian, and their discourse is self-fulfilling

Hudson 13 (Peter, Prof @ U of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, The State and the Colonial Unconscious, Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies, 39(2), p. 263-77) NOTE: Footnote 2 is included in the text of this evidence. \*\*\*We don’t endorse gendered language.

“The black man is … a determinate identity

#### Debate today is marked by a structural conflict. The question of a structural dichotomy between blackness and whiteness dominates discussions, forcing people to rethink their relationship to race and privilege. This binary is a productive one, but it masks a structural silence on the status of other identities that undermines its emancipatory goals.

Alcoff, 3 (Linda Martin Alcoff – professor of philosophy at CUNY, 2003, “LATINO/AS, ASIAN AMERICANS, AND THE BLACK–WHITE BINARY”, The Journal of Ethics, Volume 7, pp. 5-27) //MD

¶ It is unlikely … and the white poor).

#### As long as the discussion of race stays within a binary, all people of color will be stuck in a white supremacist system.

Alcoff ‘6 (Linda Martín Alcoff, Prof. of Philosophy at CUNY, Latinos, Asian Americans, and the Black‐White Binary, in Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Oxford Scholarship Online)

Critics of the black/white … (Okihiro 1994; Prashad 2000; Wu 2002).

#### The silence bred by the dominance of the black/white binary allows conservative forces to divide and conquer – the model minority myth, the tale of the high-performing Asian who proves that social uplift is possible is a paradigmatic example of a liminal identity being redeployed as a weapon in service of antiblackness

Prashad 2 (Vijay Prashad, George and Martha Kellner Chair in South Asian History and Professor of International Studies, 2002, “Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting,” pp. 40-46

The moral and … message than we suspect.

## 2NC

THE QUESTION OF IMPACT CALCULUS IS ABSOLUTE – ONLY THE HUMAN DIES BUT THE ANIMAL MERELY PERISHES TO UNMARKED GRAVES – THE GRATUITOUS VIOLENCE ENACTED UPON THE ANIMAL BODY FUNCTIONS AS A FORM OF ONTOLOGICAL DECATEGORIZATION THAT TRANSMUTES IT INTO THE NON-BODY

Pugliese, 13 (Joseph Pugliese – Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University specializing in social justice, "State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites,” 2013, pg. pg. 167-70, gender modified) //MD

The CIA black site in which Rahman is held captive is not the prison-house of the human. Rather, it is the death chamber of the object-thing whose ‘being for the captor’ is a being toward death. As a being toward death, the object-thing becomes carcass. The moment of capture enunciates the crossing of the threshold into the horror of Spillers’ vestibule, a crossing that will strip the subject of every ontological, metaphysical and legal claim to the category of the ‘human.’ Entry into the vestibule of black site prisons marks the death of the subject and the birth of the object-thing. The crossing of the threshold instantiates the biopolitical cut that will divide subject from object, human from animal. Once incarcerated and suspended in the vestibule of the Salt Pit, Rahman becomes a mere carcass, ‘a kind of absolute biopolitical substance.’25 The flesh held captive within these prisons becomes, in Fanon’s haunting words, an ‘object in the midst of other objects’26 – the cell, the shackles, the instruments of torture. A type of violent paradox configures the captive flesh of the victims: within the political economy of torture, everything pivots on the body: what can be done to it, how it can be violently rendered, and what can be extracted from it. Yet, at the same time, the somatechnologies 27 of torture work to nullify the body as ‘human body’; they trans- mute it into a corpus nullius; a non-body that is merely animal carcass. The term ‘carcass’ graphically embodies what Spillers describes as ‘the theft of the dynamic principle of the living that distinguishes the subject from his/her objectification.’28 The conversion of a subject into a captive object evacuates agency, ‘the dynamic principle of the living,’ by liquidating relations of power. ‘There cannot be rela-tions of power unless subjects are free,’ notes Foucault. ‘If one were completely at the disposition of the other and became his [/her] thing, an object on which he [/she] can exercise an infinite and unlimited violence, there would not be relations of power. In order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a certain form of liberty.’29 In Rahman’s case, the ‘theft of the dynamic principle of the living,’ the exercise of unlimited violence on his [/her] person as a captive object, and the absence of any relations of power all ensure his transmutation into carcass.¶ I deploy the uncompromising term ‘carcass’ in order to disrupt the hold of residual humanisms that would demand of the victim, who has been stripped of every possible vestige of personhood, the exercise of some redemptive agency in the face of the most horrific of situations. This demand works to reassure the privileged Western subject confronted by a site of utter subjection that something ‘human’ remains in the face of the horror that lies entirely on the hither side of their own ontological ground, even as they are structurally complicit in the production of the violence that they abhor; even as their status as human-rights- bearing subjects is predicated on the human-animal other than can be killed without punishment – as was the case in the killing of Gul Rahman. To demand and extract agency from the victims of fatal torture regimes would be tantamount to inflicting upon them yet another level of (symbolic) violence, by imposing upon them a redemptive narrative that is undone at every turn by their torture, death and unceremonious dispatch to unmarked graves. Situated in this context, carcass signifies the transmutation of the human subject into torture’s object-thing. Carcass is that object-thing that will not be liberated or redeemed and for whom, as in Gul Rahman’s case, no justice will be served. Carcass is the term for captive flesh that experiences useless suffering unto death. The useless suffering of the captive body tortured unto death is ‘intrinsically meaningless and condemned to itself without exit.’30 The dead tortured body is worthless to the captors as they can no longer hope to extract even a modicum of intelligence from their captive flesh. Without exit, immured within the totality of a black site, useless suffering implodes the subject, destroying all the sentient categories constitutive of the unitary and affective human subject through unassumable, unbearable levels of pain destined to produce that fatal animal remnant: the carcass.¶ As the product of the biopolitical caesura, the figure of the carcass enables me to begin to account for what would otherwise continue to remain inexplicable: how is it that the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani civilians that have died in the course of the war on terror fail to register in the West as deaths as such? What inviolable asymmetry divides these deaths from the Western deaths at the hands of terror that are grieved, mourned and memorialized as individuated and singular ‘first deaths’? The biopolitical caesura, through its human/ animal division, renders all those civilians killed by the West in the course of the war on terror as so many animal carcasses that, in effect, do not die but merely perish. Inscribing this Western production of human carcasses from the Global South is the metaphysics of a virulent (racio-) anthropocentrism that finds its clinical articulation in Heidegger. For Heidegger, ‘the animal,’ because it is defined by a fundamental series of privations and captivations, ‘cannot die in the sense in which dying is ascribed to human beings but can only come to an end.’31 ‘To die,’ Heidegger elaborates, ‘means to be capable of death as death. Only ~~man dies~~ [the human dies]. The animal perishes.’32 The violent operations of racio-speciesism render the subjects of the Global South as non-human animals captivated in their lawlessness and inhuman savagery and deficient in everything that defines the human-rights-bearing subject. In contradistinction to the individuating singularity of the Western subject as named person, they embody the anonymous genericity of the animal and the seriality of the undifferentiated and replaceable carcass. As subjects incapable of embodying the figure of ‘the human,’ they are animals who, when killed by torture or drone attacks, do not die but only come to an end. In a Western context, what remains is the carcass that is not worthy of mourning and that, as carcass that merely perishes, need not be taken into account as a human death – regardless of the unjust death that has been visited upon it. In the case of Gul Rahman, even the minimal remainder of the carcass is disappeared and his family are left with no body, no bones, no ashes, but only an intangible spectre encrypted in a legal footnote.¶ In order to contest this racio-anthropocentric erasure and nulliﬁcation of Global South deaths that have resulted from the war on terror, I invoke a Levinasian ethics of mourning: ‘In the death of another . . . it is not the passage from one quiddity to another that is announced; in death is the very event of passing . . . with its own acuteness that is its scandal (each death is the ﬁrst death).’ 33 In focusing on the singularity of Gul Rahman’s death, I have attempted to re-situate his passing not as a mere perishing but as a death with its own acute- ness that is its scandal. I hope, thereby, to have reclaimed his death as precisely a ﬁrst death. In the US black site prisons, Spillers’ ‘being for the captor’ is thanatologically circumscribed and temporally delimited. The captive victim can only be for the captor for the duration that his or her body can hold out against the assaults and trauma of torture. As I discussed in the Introduction, the production of the tortured carcass in these black sites is generated by inﬂicting upon the detainee two intersecting modalities of violence: instrumental and gratuitous. Instrumental violence is enabled by a battery of somatechnical instrumentalities – loudspeakers, shackles, electrical wires, cables – that are mobilized by the interrogator in the lived theatre of torture. These instruments of torture evidence the direct application of violence upon the body of the victim. Working in tandem with this instru- mental violence is gratuitous violence. Gratuitous violence operates indirectly on the body of the captive. As a torture practice, it is succinctly summed up in the slogan ‘No Blood No Foul.’ This slogan was posted on placards in US camps such as Nama, in Baghdad, Iraq, and it referred to ‘the notion, described by a Pentagon official, that “If you don’t make them bleed, they can’t prosecute you for it.” ’ 34 Among other things, gratuitous violence is what is enabled by the necropolitical architecture and ecology of these cellular black sites: total darkness, damp concrete ﬂoors and freezing cold brick walls. The gratuitous violence enabled by this necro-political matrix ensures that the detainee is entrapped within an ensemble of power relations that Foucault terms ‘unlivable’: these power relations generate a situation ‘which can’t be lived through.’ 35

## 1NR

Islamaphobia – Anti-blackness cannot explain violence against Islam which preceded the Enlightenment

Charoenying, citing Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Prof of Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley, 8 (Timothy, Islamophobia & Anti-Blackness: A Genealogical Approach, http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia-anti-blackness-genealogical-approach)

The year 1492 … of sub-Saharan Africans.

### Link

exclusive focus on blackness is bad

**Perea 97** (Juan F. Perea – Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago, 10/31/97, “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The Normal Science of American Racial Thought”, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1605&context=californialawreview) //MD

One might object … thinking about race.

Sexton relies on monoraciality which paves over other forms of racial oppression

Spickard, 9 University of California, Santa Barbara (Paul Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism (review) American Studies - Volume 50, Number 1/2, Spring/Summer 2009, pp. 125-127)

One of the major … is not that book.